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Abstract: In this paper, I argue that there is objectivity in the international human rights law, against which the
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1. Introduction
This paper poses the following question: is there objectivity in the international human rights law
(hereinafter as IHRL) against which the justifiability of arguments can be determined? To
approach this question, two preconditions shall be established: first, what do I mean by
‘objectivity’ in this context; and second, what can the answer to this question contribute to the
current human rights discourse?
To answer the first question, I shall note beforehand that this paper, although it resorts to
several philosophic ideas along the way, aims to contribute to a legal discussion. That is: can we
set out criteria for the justifiability of arguments in international human rights instruments?
Considering the scope of this paper, I would rather refrain from the rich discussion on the concept
of ‘objectivity’ in philosophy. Instead, in this paper I refer to ‘objectivity’ as a more practical
account situated in social institutions, which is to set out criteria for justifications that shall not be
influenced by individual intentions. This sense of objectivity, in a way, is what Professor John
Searle called ‘epistemic objectivity’, as opposed to ‘ontological objectivity’ (Searle 2010, pp. 1718). This perspective of ‘objectivity’, in my view, could help to reach justifiable conclusions in
certain situations that remain undecided (or even undecidable) in the current human rights
discourse. This leads me to the second question. The importance of introducing the perspective of
objectivity into human rights arguments should be considered in the broader background of
arguably the most debated topic in the human rights discourse, that is the debate on universality
vs. relativity of human rights. In other words, I propose that if there is indeed objectivity in IHRL
against which the justifiability of arguments could be determined, it could take the debate on
universality vs. relativity of human rights a step forward.
In the first part of this paper, I introduce the debate on universality vs. relativity of human
rights and argue that a perspective of objectivity could contribute to this (seemly ever-lasting)
debate. Then I propose an optimising approach for treaty interpretation in the second part. In the
third part, I argue that there is a degree of objectivity in the treaty interpretation. In the fourth part
I investigate China’s relativism argument concerning Article 1 of the Convention against Torture
and analyse its justifiability based on earlier conclusions on objectivity in treaty interpretation. I
Bondy, P., & Benacquista, L. (Eds.). Argumentation, Objectivity, and Bias: Proceedings of the 11th International
Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 18-21 May 2016. Windsor, ON: OSSA,
pp. 1-18.
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conclude this paper by addressing that although this approach could be applied to any international
treaty, it is most pertinent to IHRL given the on-going debate on universality vs. relativity of
human rights.
2. Human rights: universal or relative?
The question whether human rights are universal or relative has haunted human rights scholars for
decades. Four sorts of opinions have been put on the table so far: the first two argue for either the
universal or relative character of human rights; the third tries to find a ‘mid-way’ and reach for a
reconciliation; and the fourth asks to abandon the whole universality vs. relativity debate. In this
part, I briefly introduce each of the groups and then propose my approach to this debate.
For the purpose of consistency, I first introduce (and dismiss) the approach that asks for
abandoning the whole debate. They do nevertheless address the question where the debate could
possibly go wrong (Peerenboom 2003, Goodhart 2008). However, abandoning the debate, burying
the question, and hoping to direct attention to other ‘practical’ (as those who embrace this approach
usually suggested) approaches would only make this question a ‘pink elephant’ and in a way even
more obvious and salient. The reason here is that as ‘one of the most invoked concepts in
contemporary political discussion’ (Sen 2004, p. 315), the basic character of human rights—
universal or relative—underpins almost all the other arguments concerning human rights issues.
Therefore, although ‘changing focus’ may seem (temporarily) refreshing, the question on
universality vs. relativity of human rights will always come back (presumably sooner rather than
later) and shall be dealt with at some point. The other three groups are indeed dealing with this
question.
In the paper ‘The Relative Universality of Human Rights’ (2007), Professor Jack Donnelly
identified different types of universality and relativity arguments in the human rights discourse.
Given its comprehensiveness, I thereby use his categories to present the ideas of both the
universality and relativity groups. In the group that argues for the universality of human rights,1
there is historical or anthropological universality, which holds that the ideas of human rights could
be traced back to ancient history (not only in Europe, but also in Asia, Africa, and Islam) (Donnelly
2007, p. 284); functional universality, which takes human rights as ‘attractive remedies for some
of the most pressing systemic (modern) 2 threats to human dignity’ (Donnelly 2007, p. 288);
international legal universality, which is endorsed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) and IHRL in general (Donnelly 2007, p. 288); overlapping consensus universality,
deriving from Rawls’ theory on overlapping consensus, it focuses on the practical preference of
human rights in the current international society (Donnelly 2007, pp. 289-291); and ontological
universality, which implies that human rights has ‘[a] single trans-historical foundation’ (Donnelly
2007, p. 292). Although these are different views of universality, they do share a commonality,
that is by providing varying grounds for the universality of human rights they posit a link between

1

It is noted that Donnelly also differentiated the conceptual and substantive universality. However, I consider that this
differentiation, although it was relevant in the original context, is overlapping with the other schools of universality
ideas. To avoid confusion, I therefore do not mention these two types of universality in this part. It is also noted that
Donnelly made his judgments rather clear in his paper. That is approving the functional universality, international
legal universality, and overlapping consensus universality; while criticising the historical/anthropological universality
and ontological universality. It is for the purpose of the current discussion that I deliberately skip these comments.
2
Added by me.
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the universality of human rights and its legitimacy.3 As for the group that argues for the relativity
of human rights, there are three main types involved in the debate: the cultural relativism argument,
the self-determination and sovereignty argument, and the post-colonial/critical argument. Cultural
relativism, as Donnelly commented, is the ‘most common argument for relativity’ (Donnelly, 2007
p. 293). This idea demands ‘respect for cultural differences’ and claims that human rights norms
are relative in regard to divergent cultural traditions. Hence ‘practice is to be evaluated…by the
standards of the culture in question’ (Donnelly 2007, p. 294). 4 For the self-determination and
sovereignty argument, by invoking the protection of self-determination and international legal
sovereignty in international law, it asks for non-intervention to the States on human rights issues
(Donnelly 2007, pp. 296-297). The post-colonial/critical argument, addressing the context of
globalisation, bases its tenets on ‘the civilizationally asymmetrical power relations embedded in
the international discourse’ (Donnelly 2007, p. 297), and asks for a critical approach to prevent
‘imperial humanitarianism’ (Donnelly 2007, p. 298). It is seen that apart from some extremist
cultural relativism (which seldom becomes the main focus of the debate), relativism arguments
mostly do not aim to challenge the legitimacy of the idea of human rights in general, but rather
pose the following inquiry: given cultural, political, or structural particularities, in what sense (this
is mostly to post-structural arguments) and to what extent (this appeals mostly to cultural
relativism and sovereignty arguments) can the relativity of human rights be justified over and
against abstract universal norms?
This question to some extent has been captured by the last approach, that is to reconcile
these two characterisations of human rights and to find a (all-encompassing) solution. One of the
representative ideas in this group is Donnelly’s relative universality approach. He argued that
‘human rights are (relatively) universal at the level of the concept,’ while for ‘particular rights
concepts…relativity is not merely defensible but desirable’ (Donnelly 2007, p. 299). This
reconciling perspective has been used to argue for the possibility of the co-existence between
human rights systems and the states or regions that usually invoke relativism arguments on this
matter (see O’Sullivan 2000). This idea also to large extent echoes with the ‘thin’ and ‘thick’
concepts of rights.
It is therefore noted that, in a way, the approach that I am about to propose goes with the
last group in the sense that I also try to find a solution for the co-existence of the two
characterisations of human rights. My proposition herein is: There is (a degree of) objectivity in
the interpretation of IHRL, which provides criteria for justifying relativism arguments in the
context of IHRL. Nonetheless, this approach also differs from most approaches of the last group
in a number of aspects. First, I put this debate in the particular context of IHRL. Given that not
only the UDHR has universal implications,5 but all UN member states have ratified at least one of
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In the debate between Donnelly and Goodhart, Goodhart pointed out this link while Donnelly expressed his
objection. See Donnelly (2008). However, I do think the link with legitimacy has its position (implicitly or explicitly)
in each of the universality arguments.
4
It is noted that the cultural relativism idea presented here is the ‘substantive normative doctrine’ as Donnelly put in
his paper. There was another stream of cultural relativism—methodological cultural relativism, which was held by
some anthropologists as to against the invasion of modern western values. However, since this point of view has rarely
been mentioned in the human rights debate, I decide not to include it in the current discussion.
5
The universal implication of UDHR could be seen not only from its preamble that it is ‘a common standard of
achievement for all peoples and nations’, but also from the fact that it was adopted by UN General Assembly without
a dissenting vote. See Shaw, pp. 278-279.
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the core international human rights instruments,6 I consider that this context does not change the
overall focus of the debate, but gives it a more concrete vantage point. Second, from the
perspective of objectivity, I can give the above question—in what sense or to what extent could
the relativism arguments be justified against the universal human rights norms—a rather
straightforward answer, whereas most approaches of the group do not reach this level of certainty.
This is because by putting the whole debate in an IHRL context, I do not respond to the ontological
aspect of the question, i.e. is (or in what sense) human rights a universal or relative concept. Instead
I rather take an epistemic vein to approach this debate by proposing an (epistemic) objectivity in
IHRL. Lastly, reconciliation is neither the method nor the purpose of my approach. Given the fact
that there are both universalism and relativism arguments in international human rights
instruments, and that the debate of universality vs. relativity of human rights has created much
confusion when it comes to justify these two kinds of arguments, the aim of my approach is to
search for the criteria against which the justifiability of these arguments could be determined in
the context of IHRL.
3. Treaty interpretation: is an art is a science is…?7
Before investigating the objectivity in the arguments of IHRL, it is necessary to lay out some basic
understandings of treaty interpretation in general and my approach to this topic in particular. In
fact, there is ‘extensive doctrinal dispute’ on this particular topic (Sinclair, p. 114). Such dispute,
as Sir Sinclair put it, could be perceived from the vantage point of taking treaty interpretation as a
spectrum. At the one end of the spectrum is the idea to take treaty interpretation as an art, whereas
at the other end is to consider it as a science (Sinclair, p. 114). For those who hold that treaty
interpretation is nothing more than mastering an art, they reject that there is any rule or principle
to govern treaty interpretation. In their opinion, the ‘application (of such rules and principles) is
merely an ex post facto rationalisation of a conclusion reached on other grounds or serves as a
cover for judicial creativeness’ (Sinclair, p. 114). For those who take treaty interpretation as a
science, they believe that there are general rules as guidance for a universal application (as far as
the jurisdiction goes). Nonetheless, few scholars have taken either of the ends to its extreme. This
is because on the one hand, treaty interpretation as a human linguistic practice could never be
perfectly scientific (Merkouris, p. 6). On the other hand, if we are satisfied with taking treating
treaty interpretation as a pure matter of art that entirely relies on the skills and virtues of the
interpreter, we risk sacrificing one of the most fundamental characteristics of the rule of law, i.e.
legal certainty. In this sense, I suppose that referring to treaty interpretation as an ‘art’ or a ‘science’
cannot be understood strictly, but rather as a metaphorical way to formulate the following question.
That is: to what extent can treaty interpretation be guided by universal rules?
Although the wording varies, it is agreed that there are three schools of treaty interpretation:
the textual (also called objective) school, the intentional (or subjective) school, and the teleological
(or object and purpose) school. The textual school ‘centres on the actual text of the agreement and
emphasises the analysis of the words used’ (Shaw, pp. 932-933). The intentional school ‘looks to
the intention of the parties adopting the agreement as the solution to ambiguous provisions’ (Shaw,
‘There are nine core international human rights treaties…[A]ll UN Member States have ratified at least one core
international human rights treaty, and 80 percent have ratified four or more.’
See: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/HumanRightsBodies.aspx
7
The inspiration for this title as well as the wording of ‘art’ and ‘science’ as to describe the spectrum of treaty
interpretation is from the work of Panos Merkouris (2010).
6
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pp. 932-933). As for the third school, it holds that the object and purpose of the treaty should be
‘the most important backcloth against which the meaning of any particular treaty provision should
be measured’ (Shaw, pp.932-933). In other words, the teleological school requests the interpreter
to decide the purpose and object of a treaty in the first place and then ‘interpret it so as to give
effect to that object and purpose’ (Sinclair, pp. 114-115). Although each school turns to different
sources for determining interpretation, neither of them claims to entirely abandon interpreting rules
and principles nor do they hold that there would be no deviation of interpreting under certain rules.
It is therefore fair to say that each of the three schools stands somewhere between the ‘art’ and
‘science’ of the interpreting spectrum.
Although the three schools existed long before the adoption of 1969 Vienna Convention of
Law of Treaties (hereinafter as VCLT) (Klabbers, pp. 28-29), the 1969 VCLT was the first and
the only attempt so far to give treaty interpretation a set of universal codified rules (Orakhelashvili,
p. 287). Therefore a further discussion of the two Articles regarding treaty interpretation in the
VCLT, i.e. Articles 31 and 32, is necessary.8 In the context of this paper, I analyse the following
main concepts included in these two Articles that are pertinent to treaty interpretation in general
and IHRL in particular.9

8

Section 3 of VCLT, which includes Articles 31-33, is about interpretation of treaties. However, Article 33 of VCLT
concerning ‘interpretation of treaties authenticated in two or more languages’ deals with a rather independent and
technical issue in regard to the treaty interpretation. On the other hand, Article 31 deals with ‘general rule of
interpretation’, while Article 32 indicates ‘supplementary means of interpretation’. Therefore, this paper takes Article
31 and 32 together as the general rules of interpreting international treaties, while leaves Article 33 out of the current
discussion.
9
The text of Articles 31 and 32:
Article 31 General rule of interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text,
including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with
the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the
treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement
between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the
parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.
Article 32 Supplementary means of interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of
the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from
the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article
31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable

5
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 ‘The good faith’
The principle of good faith flows directly from the rule pacta sunt servanda (Sinclair, p. 119). In
this sense, it is primarily ‘the good faith of the parties to the treaty’ (Sinclair, p. 119). This is to
say that this rule is to guarantee that ‘[w]here a third party is called upon to interpret the treaty, his
obligation is to draw inspiration from the good faith which should animate the parties if they were
themselves called upon to seek the meaning of the text which they have drawn up’ (Sinclair, p.
120). Therefore, the principle of good faith represents the idea from the intentional school of
interpretation.
 ‘Ordinary meaning’
To read a treaty text in its ‘ordinary meaning’ as requested in Article 31 does not mean that every
text should be read literally or be subjected to pure grammatical analysis (Sinclair, p. 121); but
rather that ‘the true meaning of a text has to be arrived at by taking into account all the
consequences which normally and reasonable flow from the text’ (Sinclair, p. 121). In Special
Rapporteur Fitzmaurice’s view, this principle also implies the ‘principle of contemporaneity,’
which means ‘the terms of a treaty must be interpreted according to the meaning which they
possessed, or which would have been attributed to them, and in the light of current linguistic usage,
at the time when the treaty was originally concluded’(Sinclair, p. 124). Hence the principle of
ordinary meaning resonates with the textual school of interpretation.
 ‘Object and purpose’
There is some controversy when it comes to applying ‘object and purpose’ to treaty interpretation.
According to the original wording of Article 31, the phrase ‘object and purpose’ is used within the
context of searching for the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the text. Moreover, from the way of putting the
phrase (‘In the light of its object and purpose’), Sinclair even suggested that the reference to the
object and purpose of a treaty was ‘a secondary or ancillary process in the application of the general
rule on the interpretation’ (Sinclair, p. 130). However, this strict way of reading has been refuted
by several decisions from international courts and tribunals, which mostly concern human rights
issues. In some situations the emphasis on the object and purpose of a treaty even triumphed over
the principle of contemporaneity (Sinclair, p. 130). There are several possible reasons for such
prevailing use of ‘object and purpose’ rules in international human rights courts. One is that unlike
other international treaties, in which the object and purpose are either vaguely put or diluted in
contracting parties’ intentions, human rights treaties usually have clear and focused goals, i.e.
protecting the human rights in question. It is therefore easier to identify the object and purpose and
use them as source for interpretation. Another reason, probably a more important one, is that
compared to other international treaties, human rights treaties have a normative agenda. Therefore,
human rights courts may think it is important to protect such normative core whereas other
international courts or tribunals do not have such concern (or do not consider it of paramount
importance). Nonetheless, this element with its increasing importance clearly creates a room for
the teleological approach of treaty interpretation.
 ‘Context’:
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 31 are about the context for the interpretation. Such context includes
any agreement, instrument, subsequent agreement, and subsequent practice relating to the treaty
between the parties. This element represents the intentional approach of interpretation, for the
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contracting parties’ agreements, instruments, as well as subsequent practices are usually the results
of their established intentions.
• ‘Supplementary means of interpretation’
It is clear from the text that the travaux préparatoires and the circumstances of the conclusion
have their importance in treaty interpretation. However, the fact that they are put in Article 32 as
supplementary means also shows that their permissibility is contingent on ‘carefully controlled
circumstances’ (Sinclair, p. 142). Although some scholars suggest that Articles 31 and 32 should
be taken as a set of rules and therefore should not take Article 31 as more important than Article
32, it is still important to bear in mind that according to Article 32, the meaning resulting from
taking into account the travaux préparatories as well as the circumstances of the conclusion shall
not lead to contradictory understandings with the result of the application of Article 31 (Sinclair,
pp. 141-147). Nevertheless, resorting to the travaux préparatories and the circumstances of the
conclusion is mainly to establish the intentions.
It is therefore shown that the VCLT interpretation rules are absorbing all three schools of
interpretation. This ‘all-encompassing’ approach has been criticised for its attempt to compromise
the three schools as well as for its vagueness on the priorities of applying the different rules, which
leads to its uselessness in practice. For instance, in the first article of the compilation Treaty
Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30 Years On, Professor Jan
Klabbers argued that, among other deficits, ‘the rule(s) of Articles 31 and 32 are…a compromise
between various approaches which itself goes back to a compromise concerning the various
distinct activities that treaty interpretation signifies—and it will be obvious that not too much ought
to be expected from Article 31 and 32 as such. While it goes too far to suggest that “anything goes”
under these provisions, still, “quite a bit goes” would be a fairly accurate synopsis’ (Klabbers, p.
34). At last he suggested abandoning the VCLT rules but embracing the virtuous approach of
interpretation.
However, is this all-encompassing VCLT approach only a compromise of different
interpretation schools and therefore practically not useful? On this question, I hold a different
opinion than the criticisms. I do think that the VCLT interpretation rules capture the
intertwinement between the three approaches of interpretation, therefore unwrapping this
relationship is key to the application of the VCLT rules. This is to say that not only the raison
d’être for the VCLT interpretation rules goes deeper than a mere compromising of different
schools, but also that these rules are in fact practically applicable. To reach this understanding, I
take the inspiration from Gustav Radbruch and his theory of the antinomies of the idea of law.
In his work on legal philosophy, Radbruch proposed that the essence for the rule of law
was constituted by equality, expediency, and legal certainty (Radbruch, pp. 47-224). (As shown in
diagram 1). In his view, equality is of distributive justice: to treat like cases alike and different
cases differently; expediency addresses the purpose of the law; whereas legal certainty requires
the law to be positive (Radbruch, pp. 107-108).
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Equality

Legal
Certainty

Expediency

(Diagram 1) (Professor Bert van Roermund, personal communication, October 19, 2015)
Herein, it is probably more than a coincidence that the three schools of interpretation
respectively represent each of the element in Radbruch’s theory: the textual school embodies the
equality element. This is because this school emphasises that the original treaty text should be
taken the way it is. The ordinary meaning of the text should be treated as the general background
against which the interpretation shall be made. This approach is basic to guarantee that equals are
treated equally. The idea of intentional school is resonant with the legal certainty. The intentional
approach focuses on the authority of the interpretation by resorting to the intentions of the
contracting parties qua ‘legislators’ (such as travaux préparatories, subsequent States practices
and so on and so forth). In other words, this approach implies that by investigating the contracting
parties’ intentions, a certain interpretation gains its authority and therefore should be right. This is
also curbing judicial legislation. The teleological school, as a third pillar, represents the expediency
aspect given that it turns to the purpose and object of a treaty to seek the apt interpretation. In this
sense, there is also a triangle relationship between the three schools of interpretation that
corresponds with Radbruch’s original formula, which could be expressed as following (Diagram
2):

Textual
School

Teleological
School

Intentional
School

(Diagram 2)
In his work, Radbruch further explained the relationship between these three elements. On
the one hand, these three elements contribute to each other. Equality requires expediency as the
vantage point wherein the substance of equality can be decided; expediency demands legal
certainty since expediency is subject to disagreements between the views of individuals and
therefore cannot sustain a legal order. On the other hand, they also undermine each other.
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Expediency ‘is bound to individualize as far as possible’ and thus ‘every inequality remains
essential’ (Radbruch, p. 109); while legal certainty demands positivity without regard to either
equality or expediency (Radbruch, p. 109). Hence, these three elements, namely equality,
expediency, and legal certainty, are relative to each other— ‘yet at the same time they contradict
one another’ (Radbruch, pp. 109-111). This relationship also applies to the three schools of
interpretation as the way that Articles 31 and 32 of VCLT are represented: all the three schools are
embodied in the two Articles while no rule to determine the priority means that these three schools
of interpretation are in constant tension in their application. This relation can be easily found in
court decisions. For instance, in the case Golder v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human
Rights decided whether there was the right to access to court under Article 6 of European
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) on the right to fair trial with following reasoning: on the
one hand, the Court ‘not only rejected the view, defended by the United Kingdom, that lack of an
explicit provision in the text constitutes a reason against granting an unenumerated right. It also
stressed that the question whether to grant an unenumerated right is not a question whether we
should stick to the actual text or read words into the text’ (Letsas 2010). On the other hand, the
Court also ‘felt confident that “the object and purpose” of the ECHR contains the ideal of the rule
of law which leaves no ambiguity (which triggers resort to supplementary means under Article 32
VCLT)’ (Letsas 2010). Hence it is seen from this case that the Court made its decision by taking
all three elements into consideration while inclining to the teleological readings over the other two
approaches. Therefore, instead of simply taking the VCLT rules as a result of compromise, it is
probably more accurate to take them as a fair representation of this relative while contradicting
relationship among the three schools of interpretation. The difference between these two sorts of
understandings is that the former takes the VCLT rules as a vague abstraction that has limited
practical meaning, whereas the latter considers the VCLT rules as a way to represent the
complicated reality when dealing with treaty interpretation, in which case none of these elements
should be neglected from the discussion. Therefore, this ‘cocktail’ approach as represented in
Articles 31 and 32 of VCLT, in my opinion, is not a weakness, but rather a faithful way of
representing the relationship of different elements when interpreting a treaty.
Following this idea, I propose that there is an optimising way to conduct treaty
interpretation under the guidance of VCLT rules. That is to take treaty interpretation as a
manoeuvre among the three elements, namely equality as suggested by the textual school, certainty
as proposed by the intentional school, and expediency as represented by the teleological school. It
is the interpreter’s job to master the balance between these three elements. This is to say that it is
also in the interpreter’s power to make the manoeuvre among the three elements. In other words,
as long as human language has not achieved its logical perfection, there is always room for
manoeuvring and therefore arguing in regard to treaty interpretation. However, this does not mean
that all the power is in the hands of the interpreter or that all the arguments of interpretation are
acceptable. The bottom line is: the interpretation shall not contradict any of the three elements and
be supported by one particular approach. This bottom line marks the threshold for the justifiability
of arguments on treaty interpretation. This is, as I suggest, a practical way to apply the VCLT
rules, which also keeps the merits of prudence residing in these rules. In fact, this approach also
reflects the ultimate principle of interpretation, i.e. pacta sunt servanda. In this regard, I do to some
extent agree with the virtuous approach as suggested by Klabbers. However, such approach, in my
view, is perfectly reflected in the Articles 31 and 32 of VCLT. Moreover, bearing virtue (or
applying the principle of pacta sunt servanda) when interpreting a treaty does not mean that
interpreting is just a matter of art that is one hundred percent in the control of the interpreter. The
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power of the interpreter resides in his or her manoeuvre among the three elements, whereas what
the interpreter cannot justify is to contradict any of the element or ignore these three elements
completely. Hence, treaty interpretation, just as any other legal practice—is a craftsmanship;
neither fully art nor pure science, but comes with bottom-line rules and practical skills.
3. But, what about objectivity?
In the previous part, I came to an optimising approach of conducting treaty interpretation. In this
part, I argue that objectivity resides in all three approaches of treaty interpretation. Hence there is
an account of objectivity in treaty interpretation.
3.1. Objectivity in the intentional approach of treaty interpretation
Objectivity of the intentional approach could be established by taking intentions of a treaty as
shared intentions. This is to say that an international treaty represents shared intentions among the
participating parties. Therefore, reading the intention of a treaty is to search for shared intentions
rather than each State’s individual intentions that lie behind the text.
A shared intention, according to Professor Margaret Gilbert, is established, ‘when and only
when’ people in concern ‘are jointly committed to intend as a body to do such-and-such in the
future’ (Gilbert, p. 167). In her paper ‘Shared Intention and Personal Intentions’ (2009) Gilbert
further constructed three criteria of adequacy for an account of a shared intention, namely the
disjunction criterion, the concurrence criterion, and the obligation criterion. These three criteria
together are necessary and sufficient conditions for establishing a shared intention (Gilbert, p.171).
Therefore, an international treaty represents a shared intention among the participating parties
could be understood both from the perspective of joint commitment and the three criteria of a share
intention.
First, a shared intention is a joint commitment. A joint commitment is created when: 1)
each party is individually ready for this; and 2) each party expresses this readiness (Gilbert, p.
180). 10 ‘Once the concordant expressions of all have occurred and are common knowledge
between the parties, the joint commitment is in place’ (Gilbert, p. 180). This feature of joint
commitment is in fact well represented in the principle of ‘consent to be bound’ for treaty
participation. According to VCLT Article 2(1)b ‘the international act…whereby a State establishes
on the international plane its consent to be bound by a treaty’. Under this principle, States are
bound by showing their consent to the given treaty.11 According to Articles 11-16 of VCLT, States
show their consent to be bound via signature, exchange of instruments constituting a treaty,
ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession, or any other means if so agreed. It is reasonable to
deduce that by showing their consent to be bound via any of the above mentioned gestures, State
parties express their readiness to join the treaty in question. In this sense, an international treaty is
a joint commitment. A state’s participation to a treaty is to enter (or in the case of drafting States,
to establish) the joint commitment, in which a shared intention is formed. In addition, it is seen
that once a treaty is created, it should be taken as a whole to achieve the object and purpose of the
treaty. For instance, the purpose of the VCLT itself is to provide an understanding of the nature
and characteristics of treaties; the purpose of Convention against Torture is to protect basic human
Herein Gilbert used the word ‘personally’, which I adapt into ‘individually’, for it is an abstract account of ‘party’
rather than ‘person’ is concerned here.
11
The exception exists in the case of customary international law, which is out of the purview of the current discussion.
10
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rights in regards to preventing torture; and so on and so forth. This means that State parties to a
treaty could be taken as a body to do what the treaty is set out to do. In other words, a treaty is
what Gilbert called ‘jointly committed to intend as a body to do A’ (Gilbert, 179).
Second, one necessary condition of a shared intention is the disjunction criterion, which as
Gilbert put it, is ‘… not necessarily the case that for every shared intention, on that account, there
be correlative personal intentions of the individual parties’ (Gilbert, p. 172). In other words, a
shared intention is ‘logically possible…to exist in the absence of correlative personal intentions of
the participants’ (Gilbert, p. 182). Hence a shared intention exists as an autonomous relationship,
relatively independent of the intentions of each participant. This criterion is embodied in the fact
that ‘treaties are binding upon the parties to them and must be performed in good faith’ (Shaw, p.
903). The principle of ‘good faith’ is a way to prescribe that State parties refrain from invoking
individual intentions to deviate from shared intentions established in the treaty. Furthermore, the
binding character implies that shared intentions of a treaty shall be conformed to by State parties
regardless of States’ individual intentions. In other words, despite individual intentions of each
State party, the treaty’s intention shall be self-sufficiently construed.
Third, another necessary condition for a shared intention is the concurrence criterion. It is
to say that: ‘absent special background understandings, the concurrence of all parties is required
in order that a given shared intention be changed or rescinded, or that a given party be released
from participating in it’ (Gilbert, p. 173). This criterion is well reflected respectively in the process
of making treaty reservation, amendment and modification, as well as treaty termination and
suspension. Each of the action is either guided by the relevant provisions in a given treaty; or in
the case of absence of such provision, guided by relevant Articles of VCLT (Articles 19-23, 3941, 54-64). In either case, the concurrence of all parties is required in principle, albeit it may be
adapted to suit practical concerns.
Fourth, the last necessary condition for a shared intention is the obligation criterion, which
suggests that ‘each party to a shared intention is obligated to each to act as appropriate to the shared
intention in conjunction with the rest’ (Gilbert, p. 175). To further elaborate this criterion, Gilbert
pointed out ‘in referring to the obligations covered by this criterion I may refer to a given party’s
having an obligation to conform to the shared intention’ (Gilbert, p. 175). This criterion can be
found in Articles 26, 31, 46, and 69 of VCLT, which articulate the character of bindingness of a
treaty. Thus this is a rather obvious trait for a treaty, given that a treaty is to set out binding
obligations (Shaw, p. 905), and therefore State parties’ conformity is obliged.
Is applying Gilbert's theory of shared intention to international treaties a stretch of the
original theory which only concerns shared intentions among individuals? It certainly is. However,
from the above discussion, I have made the point that an international treaty can also be taken not
only as a joint commitment but also as satisfying all the three criteria of establishing a shared
intention. Therefore, I consider this stretch justified. It now suffices to say that since a treaty
represents a shared intention among State parties, reading the intention of a treaty is to search for
the shared intention rather than each States’ individual intentions. In this sense, there is objectivity
residing in the intentional approach of treaty interpretation.
3.2. Objectivity in the textual approach of treaty interpretation
To investigate objectivity in the textual approach of treaty interpretation is to ask the question for
what reason do State parties have to read the treaty text as it is. The answer to this question, in my
view, could be found from the perspective of (collective) speech act theory.
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A speech act, is the act characteristically performed by uttering expressions in accordance
with certain constitutive rules (Searle 1969, p.37). Paradigmatic examples of a speech act are ‘I
promise that p’, ‘I order that p’, ‘I assert that p’, and ‘I declare that p’ (Meijers, p. 93). In its
traditional analysis, a speech act is performed between a singular speaker and a singular hearer.
Professor Anthonie Meijers, in his paper ‘Collective Speech Acts,’ extends this traditional
approach to a collective approach. Herein, ‘collective speech acts’ means that the acts are
‘performed by collective agents or addressed to collective agents’ (Meijers, p. 93). This kind of
collective speech acts cannot be reduced to individual speech acts, for collective intention cannot
be reduced to individual intentions (Meijers, pp. 96-101).
In this sense, an international treaty, containing a set of (regulative and constitutive) rules
to declare legal obligations among State parties, is a (set of) speech act, or more precisely, a
collective speech act. From this vantage point, the objectivity in treaty text could be construed
from the following three aspects.
First, a treaty text is independent from the drafters’ interpretation of the given treaty. An
important characteristic of collective speech acts, as Meijers pointed out, is that ‘a collective
speaker cannot literally utter sentences. Only individuals can do that. Collective speech acts are
therefore performed by individual speakers on behalf of the group’ (Meijers, p. 101, italic added).
He further elaborated that: ‘Individuals usually don’t have to make an extra effort to know their
illocutionary intentions when performing a speech act…Groups, on the other hand, do not have
the type of epistemic access that individuals have. In order to know what a group’s intention is, a
conscious effort need to be made by the speaker who acts on behalf of the group’ (Meijers, p. 102,
italic added). This characteristic of a collective speech act explains why a treaty text, although it
was drafted by a group of delegates, shall be taken as speaking for the whole group of drafting
parties. It is because the drafters of the treaty, as a delegation, cannot utter the sentence regardless
of the intentions of drafting State parties as a whole body. Hence objectivity here resides in
representation: the actors qua delegates are bound by the intentions of the authors qua States they
represent and should not act in their own intentions.
Second, a treaty text is independent from the interpretation of the State parties as either
participating or drafting parties. Herein, I shall point out that, in the case of drafting an international
treaty, the drafting State parties act as a collective speaker, whereas the participating State parties
are not a collective hearer, but individual hearers. This is because all the participating State parties
are not construing the treaty text in question collectively qua as a body, but individually.
Nonetheless, some of the participating State parties are also the drafting State parties. This is to
say that, in the scenario of States participating to an international treaty, it is the drafting parties as
a collective speaker that addresses the participating parties as individual hearers, wherein a part of
the individual hearers also constitute the collective speaker. It is now clear that a treaty text qua
collective speech act shall be construed independently from the interpretation of State parties that
are not part of the collective speaker, for they are the hearers of the speech act. Then, is the treaty
text also independent from the State parties that are also drafting parties? The answer is yes,
because the speaker is collective and therefore cannot be reduced to any of the drafting parties.
Third, a treaty text is in practice independent from the interpretation of drafting parties as
a whole body. It is established that the drafting States as a whole are the collective speaker of the
treaty qua collective speech act. In principle, they have the capacity to determine the meaning of
the text as a body. However, in practice, the moment that a treaty was created, the ‘drafting States

12

JINGJING WU
as a whole body’ disappeared and transformed into individual hearers.12 Therefore, it is almost
impossible to ask all the drafting parties to act as a whole body again and give the meaning of a
particular text after the treaty is created—at least the possibility is so low that in fact it never
happened in international legal practice. In this sense, the text has its practical independence from
the drafting States as a whole.
Given the above three accounts, a treaty text shall be read as being (practically)
independent from the interpretations of drafters, participating State parties, as well as drafting
States as a whole. It is in this sense that objectivity is found in the textual approach of treaty
interpretation.
3.3. Objectivity in the purpose and object approach in treaty interpretation
The purpose and object of a treaty first and foremost represents a shared intention of the State
parties. Therefore, as discussed above, a party could not opt out from this joint commitment
without breaking its commitment. This is the very logic behind the basic assumption of
international law that ‘in the absence of a certain minimum belief that states will perform their
treaty obligations in good faith, there is no reason for countries to enter into such obligations with
each other’ (Shaw, p. 904). Moreover, this shared intention itself, as aforementioned, cannot be
reduced to individual intentions and therefore possesses a certain objectivity. Now the question
follows: does the objectivity of the purpose and object of a treaty in any interesting way
differentiate from the objectivity residing in shared intentions of a treaty? I incline to answer yes
for two reasons.
First, the purpose and object of a treaty is the fundamental shared intention among
participating parties. In other words, it is a core joint commitment. This is to say that if all the
participating parties could only agree on one thing and still intend to establish a treaty, that should
be the purpose and object of the treaty. Therefore, when contradictory interpretations are found in
the purpose and object of a treaty and other shared intentions, it is justifiable to give the
interpretation based on purpose and object more weight. Second, the purpose and object of a treaty
is a declaration, whereas not all the shared intentions in a treaty are as such. A declaration, as a
special kind of speech act, has the power to change the reality ‘by declaring that a state of affairs
exist and thus bringing that state of affairs into existence’ (Searle 2010, p. 13). Hence, given this
characteristic, the criteria for satisfying the purpose and object of a treaty is to fulfil this speech
act; while to fulfil this speech act is to bring the utterance of that speech act into reality. It therefore
brings another dimension of objectivity into the picture. That is the participating parties are obliged
to satisfy the purpose and object of the treaty, which is objectively observable. In other words,
participating parties should be mutually seen to further the common cause. Therefore, a certain
sense of transparency is required. This is also reflected in the monitoring activities of treaty bodies.
I can now explain the implications of the perspective of objectivity on applying Articles 31
and 32 of VCLT in practices. From the intentional approach, firstly, concerning the principle of
‘the good faith’,13 it shall be established that where a third party is called upon to interpret the
treaty, his or her obligation is to draw inspiration from the good faith which should animate the
12

This is given that the drafting states have also showed their consent to be bound by the treaty after the creation of
the treaty according to relevant procedures.
13
As mentioned above, ‘[w]here a third party is called upon to interpret the treaty, his obligation is to draw inspiration
from the good faith which should animate the parties if they were themselves called upon to seek the meaning of the
text which they have drawn up’ (Sinclair, p. 120).
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parties if they were themselves called upon as a whole body to seek the meaning of the text which
they have drawn up. Secondly, considering the ‘context’ for interpretation, which includes the
subsequent agreements, instruments, as well as practices that relate to the treaty between parties,
it shall then concern all relating parties. Last but not least, regarding the use of travaux
préparatoires in treaty interpretation, the content to search for is not any party’s interpretation
regarding the given issue, but the interpretation that has been documented as the common (shared)
understanding that all (or count as all by given process) parties agreed upon in the process of treaty
creation and decided collectively to ascribe to such understanding. From the textual approach, it
could be drawn that interpreters certainly can dive into the travaux préparatoires searching for the
original intentions of the drafting states as a source for interpreting. However, not all the issues are
discussed and documented in the travaux préparatoires, nor do all the issues that have been found
there have a clear-cut answer. This is why the principle of ‘ordinary meaning’ is one of the most
important elements in treaty interpretation. This principle makes it clear that a treaty text, to large
extent, should be independent from the intentions of any of the drafters, the participating States,
and even the drafting parties as a whole and therefore be taken as it is. Lastly, the objectivity in
the teleological approach implies that there is a fundamental shared intention in each international
treaty, to which the State parties jointly committed themselves. It follows that when it comes to
particular arguments on the object and purpose of a treaty, there is also a shared presupposition
that the truth-value of the purpose and object is taken for granted (otherwise the State is expected
not to join the treaty in the first place) and therefore the arguments should focus on the satisfaction
of the object and purpose qua declaration.
As discussed in the earlier part, a justifiable argument of treaty interpretation under VCLT
rules shall be conducted in the way that not contradicting any of the three approaches while being
supported by one of them. Now I can add that since there is a perspective of objectivity residing
in each of the approach, this objectivity can also be transferred into the whole process of treaty
interpretation. In the next part, I will elaborate how this perspective could help us to determine the
justifiability of relativism arguments in regards to IHRL by a brief case study.
4. Now, a brief case study
The case study I choose here is China’s relativism arguments regarding Article 1 of Convention
against Torture (hereinafter as CAT) on the definition of torture in the States’ session of the CAT
committee.14 I would like to illustrate how the objectivity in treaty interpretation could help to
determine the justifiability of relativism arguments.
There were two relativism arguments that China used concerning CAT Article 1.15 One is
about the Committee’s request to incorporate the definition of torture as stated in Article 1 into
State’s session is the procedure when an international human rights treaty committee discusses the State's report
with the State’s delegation and issues concluding observations and comments.
15
Article 1 of CAT concerns the definition of torture, which reads as:
14

1. For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by which severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a
third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or
a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering
is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
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domestic law; the other is about China using ‘seriousness’ to distinguish torture in its report. For
the former issue, in the 1990 national session, Committee member Ms. Chanet pointed out that ‘no
specific definition of torture had been included in Chinese legislation so as to ensure that torture
was an offence under criminal law’ (CAT/C/SR.51, para. 36). As a response, the Chinese
delegation argued as following: ‘[d]efinition of torture varied, so that what in the Chinese view
was positive might be considered negative elsewhere’ (CAT/C/SR.51, para. 50). This response, as
one of China’s earliest opinions regarding the interpretation of CAT, was an obvious relativism
argument. It argues for a different view of torture than the one enshrined in CAT. Hence firstly it
is not only not supported but to some extent contradictory with the text of the definition of torture
as set out in Article 1. Secondly, China’s argument did not refer to the purpose or object of the
Convention to justify such deviation. Thirdly, from the intentional perspective, albeit that Chinese
delegation expressed their own point for holding a different view of torture, they did not resort to
the shared intention in the Convention to support their point. In addition, as argued above, China’s
individual intention could not be invoked as a source for treaty interpretation. Therefore, it could
be concluded that this relativism argument was not a justifiable argument. In fact, in later sessions,
the Chinese delegation fully changed this relativism position. Instead they listed several provisions
from the Chinese Penal Code (CAT/C/SR.145/Add.2, para. 12), and argued that the definition of
torture was included in Chinese domestic law but in a diffused manner. This change of arguments
in a way shows the un-justifiability of the former argument.
For the latter issue, China intended to defend its distinction between serious and especially
serious cases of torture with a relativism argument, which reads as following:
Concerning the distinction made by judicial bodies between acts of torture
constituting minor, serious or particularly serious offences, all acts of torture were
prohibited and punished under Chinese law. Given its cultural and legal specificity,
however, China believed that minor offences were part of administrative law and
should consequently be subject to administrative punishment… In Chinese law,
that procedure was consistent with the principle of proportionality… In the case of
relatively minor offences with less serious consequences, the procuratorate would
make recommendations to the competent departments with a view to the imposition
of disciplinary and administrative punishments (CAT/C/SR. 846, para. 19).
This argument is to distinguish the ‘seriousness’ of torture in China’s interpretation, which
according to the argument, was mainly based on China’s particular cultural and legal tradition.
Thus it is also a relativism argument concerning the definition of torture. To investigate its
justifiability, firstly from the textual reading of the Article 1, it is seen that torture is by definition
a serious crime (CAT/C/SR. 844, para 64). In this sense, categorising torture into ‘relatively minor
offences with less serious consequences’ (as the Chinese delegation mentioned) contradicts the
definition of torture, i.e. a serious crime. Secondly, from an intentional perspective, according to
the travaux préparatoires, there was an intense debate between delegations about distinguishing
between torture and cruel and inhuman treatment (Norwak, McArthur et al., pp. 30-50). As a result
person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent
in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
2. This Article is without prejudice to any international instrument or national legislation which does or may contain
provisions of wider application.
See: http://www.unhcr.org/49e479d10.html
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of this debate, the ‘severity’ of torture is one of the essential elements for establishing torture. This
further proves the textual reading that torture is a serious crime by definition and therefore cannot
be applied to the principle of proportionality wherein ‘minor offences’ are considered as an option.
In addition, since the object and purpose of CAT is to prevent torture in any form, to distinguish
grades of seriousness in torture also goes against this purpose of full prevention. Therefore, since
this relativism argument contradicts all three elements of interpretation, the given argument cannot
be justified.
5. Conclusion
Now I can come back to the question that has been posed by different schools of relativism, that
is: in what way or to what extent could relativism arguments be justified against universal norms
of human rights? The answer to this question is closely related to the question that I posed at the
beginning of this paper: is there objectivity in IHRL against which the justifiability of arguments
can be determined? The answer to both questions that this paper has reached is: insofar as IHRL
and its interpretation are at issue, relativism arguments are justifiable if they do not contradict the
intentional, textual, or teleological reading of the treaty in question and be supported by one of
them. In addition, such criteria for justifiability have epistemic objectivity and therefore won’t be
trapped in the uncertainty suggested by the universality vs. relativity debate. This is because it
circumvents the bias that the debate of universality vs. relativity of human rights is by nature an
ontological debate. Although some schools of thoughts try to take ontological characteristic out of
their claims (such as the ideas of historical universality, overlapping consensus universality, or
functional universality), it is still largely believed that claiming ‘human rights is universal’, no
matter what preconditions are given, is ontological and cannot be taken otherwise. As far as the
theory in question is still making an ontological point, universality and relativity cannot co-exist
in the same space and timeframe. Therefore, a boundary shall be drawn, which is most approaches
in the reconciliation group are concerned with. However, these ‘line-drawing’ efforts are usually
too vague to be applied practically. In this paper, on the other hand, I propose to explore the
epistemic side of the story and find out that this approach can give the question a clearer answer
by focusing on objectivity in treaty interpretation in IHRL. In other words, objectivity (in its
epistemic sense), as an alternative perspective, provides a substantial vantage point to deal with
the universality vs. relativity debate in the human rights discourse, without being trapped in its
ontological difficulty.
Indeed, this approach could be applied to any international treaty and arguments conducted
in that given institution. Nonetheless, I consider this perspective most pertinent to the human rights
discourse. One of the reasons is that the debate of the universality vs. relativity of human rights
has made the relativism arguments seem more appealing than they actually could be justified.
Therefore those arguments are invoked more often (than they should be) by the States that intend
to justify their deviations from IHRL. In this sense, it is important to point out that insofar as IHRL
is concerned, there is a perspective of objectivity in the interpretation, which should be resorted to
when it comes to justifying arguments in IHRL, especially those relativism arguments.
Finally, does this approach limit the original debate by putting it in a legal context? It
probably does. Have I changed an ontological focus on universality vs. relativity of human rights
into an epistemic objectivity of determining arguments on universality vs. relativity in IHRL? I
certainly have. Yet when the original debate is so fundamental while discordant, I think ‘one
certainty at a time’ is a preferred approach. This is not to say that the debate on the universality vs.
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relativity of human rights is unsolvable in an ontological sense; but that before we reach that level
of knowledge, it is probably desirable to take the debate a step forward even only in the legal
context via epistemic objectivity.
References
Committee Against Torture, (27 April 2009), Forty-first session, Summary record of the 844th
Meeting (CAT/C/SR.844).
Committee Against Torture, (10 November 2008), Forty-first session, Summary Record of the
846th Meeting, (CAT/C/SR.846).
Committee Against Torture, (4 May 1990), Fourth session, Summary Record of the 51st Meeting
(CAT/C/SR.51).
Donnelly, J. (2007). The relative universality of human rights. Human Rights Quarterly 29 (2),
281-306.
Donnelly, J. (2008). Human rights: both universal and relative (A reply to Michael Goodhart).
Human Rights Quarterly 30 (1), 194-204.
Gilbert, M. (2009). Shared intention and personal intentions. Philos Stud, 167-187.
Golder v. United Kingdom, Series A No. 18, 1 EHRR (1979–1980) 524.
Klabbers, J. (2010). Virtuous Interpretation. In: M. Fitzmaurice, O. Elias, & P. Merkouris (Eds.),
Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30 Years on (Vol.
1). Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Lask, E., Radbruch, G., & Dabin, J. (1950). The Legal Philosophies of Lask, Radbruch, and Dabin.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Letsas, G. (2010). Strasbourg’s interpretive ethic: Lessons for the international lawyer. The
European Journal of International Law 21 (3), 509-541.
Meijers, A. (2007). Collective speech acts. In: S. L. Tsohatzidis (Ed.), Intentional Acts and
Institutional Facts: Essays on John Searle's Social Ontology. Dordrecht: Springer.
Merkouris, P. (2010). Introduction: Interpretation is a science, is an art, is a science. In: M.
Fitzmaurice, O. Elias, & P. Merkouris (Eds.), Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30 Years on (Vol. 1). Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers.
Norwak, M., McArthur, E., & al, e. (2008). The United Nations Convention Against Torture: A
Commentary. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
O'Sullivan, D. (2000). Is the declaration of human rights universal? The International Journal of
Human Rights 4 (1), 25-53.
Orakhelashvili, A. (2008). The Interpretation of Acts and Rules in Public International Law.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Peerenboom, R. (2003). Beyond universalism and relativism: the evolving debates about values
in Asia. Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 14 (1), 1-85.
Searle, J. R. (1969). Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Searle, J. R. (2010). Making the Social World : the Structure of Human Civilization. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Sen, A. (2004). Elements of a theory of human rights. Philosophy and Public Affairs 32 (4), 315356.

17

JINGJING WU
Shaw, M. N. (2008). International Law (sixth edition ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Sinclair, S. I. (1984). The Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (second ed.). Manchester:
Manchester University Press.
United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United Nations, Treaty
Series, vol. 1155, p. 331.

18

